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Abstract—Big data processing is often outsourced to powerful,
but untrusted cloud service providers that provide agile and
scalable computing resources to weaker clients. However, un-
trusted cloud services do not ensure the integrity of data and
computations while clients have no control over the outsourced
computation or no means to check the correctness of the execu-
tion. Despite a growing interest and recent progress in verifiable
computation, the existing techniques are still not practical enough
for big data processing due to high verification overhead.
In this paper, we present a solution called V-MR (Verifiable
MapReduce), which is a framework that verifies the integrity of
MapReduce computation outsourced in the untrusted cloud via
partial re-execution. V-MR is practically effective and efficient
in that (1) it can detect the violation of MapReduce computation
integrity and identify the malicious workers involved in the
that produced the incorrect computation. (2) it can reduce the
overhead of verification via partial re-execution with carefully
selected input data and program code using program analysis.
The experiment results of a prototype of V-MR show that V-MR
can verify the integrity of MapReduce computation effectively
with small overhead for partial re-execution.
Index Terms—big data anlytics, computation integrity, MapRe-
duce, verification, partial re-execution, program analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
Large-scale distributed computations based on big data
processing frameworks such as MapReduce and Apache Spark
are often outsourced to public cloud service providers, which
use computationally powerful platforms. While outsourced
computation provisions cost-effective and flexible computing
resources to a client, the client has no control over the
outsourced computation or no means to check the correctness
of the execution. The client expects that the cloud provider
honestly executes the outsourced program over data and pro-
duce the expected output.
However, a dishonest cloud provider could simply not run a
client’s code to completion to save on resources or try to cheat
and return incorrect computation results to the client. To this
end, our goal is to provide guarantees of computation integrity
(i.e., verification of execution integrity of the program over the
data) that the outsourced computation had not been tampered
by adversaries.
Several approaches to verify the integrity of the outsourced
computation have been proposed. We consider the crypto-
graphic and complexity-theoretic approaches [1, 2] are still
far from practical. Replication-based result verification ap-
proaches [3]–[6] in MapReduce computation rely on redundant
computation resources to execute duplicated individual task for
all the jobs which incurs high cost. MapReduce computation
is often distributed across distributed worker nodes, so the
approaches are not scalable.
In this work, we are primarily interested in the computation
integrity of the user-defined MapReduce programs which are
executed by distributed workers. MapReduce framework runs
arbitrary binary code submitted by a client. The output is
determined by the input data, ensuring its final result should
be correct as long as the input data remain preserved and
the computation is correct (Figure 1). A naive approach to
integrity verification of MapReduce computations is to re-
execute every Map and Reduce task, which the workers in the
public cloud have executed to verify the correctness of the past
computations. However, the overhead of this approach can be
very high, particularly if the number of workers is large, as the
private cloud is generally less powerful than the public cloud
with limited resources. The naive replication-based result-
integrity checks in hybrid cloud [5] is not practical as well,
which is the verification is done by checking the consistency of
results among replicas. Most replication-based approaches [5]–
[7] only provide probabilistic detection of wrong computation.
Large scale data processing often requires a large number of
replicas that incur very high overhead. We argue that a better
approach is to selectively and partially re-execute tasks on the
trusted verifier.
Fig. 1. Big Data Processing in Untrusted Cloud Environment
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The goal of this work is to provide integrity guarantees
of outsourced computations to the clients by efficient com-
putation integrity auditing of workers. In particular, given the
input data, the execution of the program over the data can
be checked by detecting tampered computation through par-
tial re-execution, which is the practical verification approach
with smaller overhead compared to naive full re-execution or
replication approach.
To this end, we propose Verifiable MapReduce (V-MR),
a solution to detect tampered MapReduce computation and
identify the malicious workers that produced the wrong
output via partial re-execution. V-MR collects execution
traces during the original execution and preprocesses the
traces using data and control flow information to find
data slice and program slice (executable slice) for partial
re-execution. V-MR performs the partial re-execution of
Map and Reduce tasks with selected input data (data slice)
and program code (program slice) for efficient auditing the
computation results and therefore detecting any malicious
workers that did not execute the client’s program as expected.
To summarize, we make the following contributions.
• We introduce the efficient and practical Verifiable
MapReduce (V-MR) for verifying the integrity of the
MapReduce computations via partial re-execution with
the reduced re-execution overhead.
• We introduce input data slicing and program slicing by
control flow filtering based on static and dynamic analysis
to reduce the input dataset which is used for re-execution.
• We present a new program transformation technique us-
ing the bytecode engineering library, which automatically
transforms the original program to the new code to re-
execute for the verification of computation integrity.
• We show the experimental results with several MapRe-
duce applications, the reduced overhead of V-MR com-
pared to naive replication approach that requires full re-
execution or random input selection.
II. RELATED WORK
Replication-based Verification: SecureMR [7] adopts a de-
centralized replication-based integrity verification scheme, and
utilizes the existing architecture of MapReduce for replication
purposes. Replication is broadly used in distributed systems
to improve reliability and fault-tolerance, as well as for com-
putation integrity in big data computing such as MapReduce.
However, the assumption that there is no collusion between
workers is needed when the result checking is based on voting
by the workers. Furthermore, redundant and replication based
approach incurs high cost. Our solution does not require the
assumption and reduces the overhead of the replication.
Hardware-based Verification: Recently, several ap-
proaches have been proposed to protect computation integrity
in the cloud leveraging the hardware protection of Intel
SGX, which recently has been receiving much attention.
For example, Haven [8] runs service instances in hardware-
protected SGX enclaves [9] and attest to a hash of the code
so that the instance owner can verify that it was launched
correctly. VC3 [10], M2R [11], and Ohrimenko et al. [12] use
SGX to perform data analytics, MapReduce computations, and
machine learning computations while ensuring confidentiality
and integrity. This ensures the integrity of the software stack
loaded, but it does not gurantee the execution integrity of the
program atop the software stack. Haven [8] relies on Intel
SGX for shielded execution of unmodified legacy applications
to protect the confidentiality and integrity of a program and
its data from the platform on which it runs.
Proof-based Verification: Proof-based verifiable computa-
tion is a one of the approaches that verifies the integrity of the
remote computation. In this class of works, the verifier (the
private cloud in our setting) will generate a set of constraints
C about the runtime values of variables in the program. During
the execution, the prover (the public cloud in our setting) will
generate the proof of the computation based on the runtime
value of variables. The verifier then will perform a set of
tests on the proof based on C. If the program was executed
faithfully, the test will pass; otherwise, the test will fail, except
for a very small probability. Systems following this direction
include Pepper [13], Buffet [14], TinyRAM [15], etc. These
approaches incur an expensive overhead in both the verifier
and the prover amd can only support simple programs.
Record-replay approaches: VM replay [16], ReVirt [17],
Ripley [18], POIROT [19], and OROCHI [20] are based
on record-and-replay techniques. In particular, POIROT and
OROCHI’s approaches are mostly close to our approach but
their works are for web applications while our work is for
MapReduce applications.
III. THREAT MODEL
The attack surface we consider in this work is that of
MapReduce applications which run on distributed worker
nodes. Malicious adversaries have capability to manipulate
computation results or the user-defined map and reduce func-
tions to produce incorrect results.
We assume that a clients program (user-defined map and
reduce function) is benign when she submitted the job request
to the cluster, in which the client is honest who will never
intentionally try to compromise the worker nodes. However,
a clients virtual machine (or container) images in the public
cloud are not trusted, which execute the user-defined program.
The images may have security vulnerabilities that an adversary
can exploit. A powerful adversary can alter input, intermediate
and final outputs of MapReduce computations or tamper the
user-defined program to produce incorrect results.
We assume the master node is trusted, backed by strong
security, which is responsible for job scheduling and resource
management of worker nodes in the cluster while workers
are not trusted. We also assume the Distributed File System
(DFS) is trusted, which manages the file system namespace
and regulates access to files by clients.
The verifier is assumed to be trustworthy and protected from
attack. The verifier collects the execution trace logs provided
by the workers in the public cloud and the < input, output >
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of each task that has been executed and checks if worker nodes
have executed the computation as expected.
An important assumption for our re-execution based verifi-
cation approach is that the MapReduce program (i.e., map and
reduce function) is deterministic. The assumption guarantees
that all executions of the program with the same input always
produce the same output. Thus, when given the same input,
an honest worker always returns the correct result for its com-
putation task while a malicious worker may return arbitrary
or manipulated results.
A. Attacks on the MR computation
In this work, we consider two types of attacks on MR
computation.
Cheating Computation: A cheating worker tries to skip
some part or the entire of the computation and return only a
subset of results to reduce its computing cost. Most machine
learning and data mining applications involve iterative compu-
tations over large datasets so skipping the execution of part of
the loops in the program (that has the operation of writing the
output to the local disk or DFS) could be an attack example.
Cheating workers are relatively easy to detect as discussed in
[21].
Malicious Computation: A malicious worker can disrupt
the computation of map or reduce instances by tampering
with the code or data submitted by a client, resulting to yield
the incorrect computation results. Even one worker’s incorrect
computation can yield the overall incorrect final results. In this
work, we focused on malicious computation attack.
B. Integrity of Execution Trace Log
In this work, the execution trace log recorded during normal
execution is essential for auditing the computation results. We
assume that the execution trace logs are protected from the
integrity attack in which an adversary cannot alter the logs,
while an untrusted worker could return the wrong computation
results. We assume the hypervisor is trusted and leverage
virtual machine based techniques [17] that provide hypervisor-
supported inspection or tamper-evident logging [22, 23] for
protecting the audit logs from the integrity attack. We make
the audit logs are append-only such as LogFAS [24]. LogFAS
is a PKC-based secure audit logging scheme that can produce
publicly verifiable forward-secure and append-only signatures
without requiring any online trusted server support.
IV. OVERVIEW
Our focus is on verifying the integrity of MapReduce
computation in untrusted cloud computing environment. Our
approach is to use partial re-execution for verifying whether
untrusted MapReduce workers provided correct computation
results for assigned program and data, by re-executing only a
part of the original MapReduce computations to minimize the
re-execution overhead.
Through the experiment with multiple MapReduce applica-
tions, we observed that there is much similarity among the
execution traces of workers as workers assigend for the job
execute the same MapReduce program in parallel. Each Map
and Reduce task execution follow a relatively small number of
execution paths (control flow) and the difference of execution
paths is mostly caused by different input data. Our approach
is similar to record and replay approaches [16]–[18] which
record computation history (execution traces) and replay (re-
execution).
Our approach comprises of two stages: online tracing and
offline verification. Online tracing is to record execution traces
of the user-defined MapReduce application on every worker
node during normal execution. The offline verifier analyzes
the execution traces to identify and select the requests to re-
execute and prepare the new code (if optimization is possible)
and the input data for partial re-execution. The verifier re-
executes the chosen requests with chosen input data and com-
pares the outputs of the original execution and re-execution. If
the outputs are different, the verifier rejects the computation
for the job and reports the malicious worker that executed the
request and produced the corresponding incorrect output.
The architecture of V-MR is illustrated in Figure 2. We
consider parallel and distributed applications such as MapRe-
duce applications run on worker nodes (computing nodes) in
a cluster.
A client submits a job with the user-defined MapReduce
program and data to the cluster and receives the computation
results. All MapReduce workers assigned for a job are asked
to submit the execution traces of the program as proof of the
correct execution, which is recorded during program execu-
tion. The offline verifier checks if all workers performed the
submitted job correctly as expected using the execution traces.
V-MR comprises of 1) offline preprocessing of bytecode-
level execution traces, 2) selection of requests for the re-
execution based on control flow and data flow analysis, re-
execution code generation if duplicate computations across
workers are discovered, and 3) re-execution of the original
or new code that has been generated, and 4) the comparison
of the outputs from the two executions and make a decision
to accept or reject the computation result. For the rejected
computation results, V-MR identifies the corresponding work-
ers that computed the requests and marks those as malicious
workers.
A. Static Control-Flow Analysis
To reduce the overhead of verification, we use static analysis
and generate the Control Flow Graph (CFG) from Java byte-
code of the user-defined MapReduce program. Static analysis
helps reduce the overhead of dynamic analysis and explores all
execution paths without running the program, typically from
source code. Control flow analysis determines the execution
order of program instructions. It brings a global overview of
the execution paths that the input data can take during the
execution process. In this context, we represent a Java method
of a class with its CFG that consists of a set of its execution
paths because we use the MapReduce framework in Java.
V-MR generates control flow graphs for map and reduce
function using static analysis of the user-defined MapReduce
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Fig. 2. Overview of V-MR design
program. Control Flow Graph G=(V,E) is a directed graph
which represents the execution flow of the program. Where V
is the set of vertices representing basic blocks, and E is the
set of edges - an edge from basic block BB1 to basic block
BB2 (BB1, BB2 ∈ V) indicates that execution of block BB2
can immediately follow the execution of block BB1. A basic
block is the sequence of executable instruction with a single
entry point at the beginning and exit point at the end. Control
flow analysis consists in computing the control flow graph of
a method, and in performing analyses on this graph.
The Control Flow Graph is used in the verification phase
for detecting invalid control flow paths and filtering out the
corresponding requests from the verification, which followed
the invalid execution path.
A client submits the job to the cluster with the compiled
MapReduce program in binary form (jar file). We use the ASM
bytecode engineering library to generates the CFG from the
bytecode of the program. Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the
generated and visualized CFGs for map and reduce function
of WordCount program using the ASM and GraphViz [25].
V-MR uses the control flow graph in the verification phase
for detecting invalid execution paths and filtering out the
corresponding requests from the verification, which followed
the invalid execution path.
B. Tracing during Original Execution
V-MR records the execution trace of the user-defined
MapReduce program during normal execution, which runs
parallel on multiple worker nodes. An execution trace is a
sequence of instructions which represents the execution history
of a program and provides the details of a program’s dynamic
1 public void map(Object key, Text
value, Context context
2 ) throws IOException,
InterruptedException {
3 StringTokenizer itr = new
StringTokenizer(value.toString());
4 while (itr.hasMoreTokens()) {
5 word.set(itr.nextToken());
6 context.write(word, one);
7 }
8 }
9 ....
10
11 public void reduce(Text key,
Iterable<IntWritable> values,
12 Context context
13 ) throws IOException,
InterruptedException
{
14 int sum = 0;
15 for (IntWritable val : values) {
16 sum += val.get();
17 }
18 result.set(sum);
19 context.write(key, result);
20 }
Fig. 3. WordCount example code snippet
behavior. V-MR collects and analyzes the execution traces to
select the partial input data and code for efficient re-execution.
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Fig. 4. Control Flow Graph of WordCount map()
Fig. 5. Control Flow Graph of WordCount reduce()
Recording all of the execution would not be practical due
to significant time and space overhead. To reduce the tracing
overhead, V-MR logs the selected execution trace in terms
of control flow (control flow trace), as not all of the trace
data is of our interest. V-MR also logs input < key, value >
pair, branch condition and count if it is a loop, output
< key, value > pair for map() and reduce() function.
V-MR performs partial re-execution during the verification
phase. For the verification, V-MR re-executes the program with
the same input that processed the corresponding request.
1) Tracing Control Flow: During the original execution,
V-MR records the control flow trace of the application for
each request which each map() or reduce() instance processes.
A control flow trace captures the complete path followed by
a program during the execution at the level of Basic Block.
1 public void map(Object key, Text
value, Context context
2 ) throws IOException,
InterruptedException {
3 mapID = getMapId()
4 in = (<key, value>)
5
6 StringTokenizer itr = new
StringTokenizer(value.toString());
7 L0 //Basic Block
8 while (itr.hasMoreTokens())
9 bcondition = itr.hasMoreTokens())
10 {
11 L1
12 word.set(itr.nextToken());
13 context.write(word, one);
14 out = (<word, one>)
15 }
16 L2
17 }
Fig. 6. Instrumented code snippet for WordCount map() function. The figure
shows the bytecode instrumentation at the source level for clarity, but
the actual instrumentation is done directly at the bytecode level. The
statements in red are those instrumented.
However, tracing the entire execution of the program incurs
a high space and time overhead so we trace the bytecode
instructions that caused the control flow transfer, such as
conditional branch instructions (e.g., ifeq, ifne, if icmpeq) and
unconditional branch instructions (e.g., goto, jsr, ret). V-MR
also records the requests that executed the basic block that
includes the calls to context.write() which contributed to the
output of the request.
A MapReduce job is assigned and executed by many
workers in parallel with the same user-defined program so
the computation performed by each Map or Reduce task is
expected to follow the same control flow given the same input
data. In terms of execution traces, the sequence of bytecode in-
structions executed is similar (not equal) but different control-
flow paths by input-dependent control transfers.
In WordCount example (3 and 4), the control flow traces
of map() instances with different input records are as follows.
The number in the control flow trace represents the basic
block index. To minimize the overhead of tracing, V-MR
traces the control flow transfer only. The execution of BB1
is not recorded as the basic block doesn’t have control flow
transfer. All mappers commonly execute BB1 for all requests.
During the preprocessing phase, V-MR groups the requests
using control flow traces.
Input record <1, "test input">:
CTF: 2, 3, 2, 3, 2, 4
Input record <1, "test">:
CFT: 2, 3, 2, 4
5
1 13: aload 4
2 15: invokevirtual #8
3 18: ifeq 47
4 ........................
5 21: aload_0
6 22: getfield #4
7 25: aload 4
8 27: invokevirtual #9
9 30: invokevirtual #10
10 33: aload_3
11 34: aload_0
12 35: getfield #4
13 38: getstatic #11
14 41: invokevirtual #12
15 44: goto 13
16 .........................
17 47: return
Fig. 7. Java bytecode instructions for lines in 4-7 (while loop) in Figure 3
C. Partial Re-execution
The goal of our work is to produce the practical verification
of result integrity via efficient partial re-execution. The re-
execution cost needs to be minimized for efficient verification
while the correctness and completeness of the verification need
to be guaranteed as well. Finding the solution that satisfies
both conditions is challenging.
Through our experiments with several MapReduce applica-
tions, we observed that there are a relatively small number
of control flow paths among the executions of MapReduce in-
stances across workers. That is because the distributed workers
execute the same user-defined MapReduce program in parallel
on their assigned data partitions for a given job. Different
inputs may cause different control flows yet a relatively small
number of execution paths (i.e., control flow paths) per each
Map or Reduce task. To achieve efficient integrity verification
using partial re-execution, we aim to reduce the input data set
and the instructions of the re-execution code. Based on our
observation, we leverage the control flow trace of each Map
and Reduce instance for selecting the part of the input data
set (input data slice).
V-MR groups the Map and Reduce instances that have the
same control flow into a control flow group. Then, V-MR
identifies the control flow group that did not lead to the outputs
by checking whether the control flow trace of the group shows
the execution of the basic block that has the instruction to emit
the output (calls to context.write() in Hadoop v2).
1) Input Data Slicing for Partial Re-execution: Naively re-
executing all instances of Map and Reduce function on all
input data for the verification incurs the high overhead. To
amortize the verification cost, V-MR re-executes only parts of
the MapReduce function call instances after it filters out any
input records that did not contribute to the output. MapReduce
applications have a relatively simple control flows due to the
defined programming model of the map and reduce function.
Based on our observation that a MapReduce program has
multiple identical computations across workers, we use the
control flow traces for selecting parts of input data (input data
slice) for partial re-execution, similar to POIROT’s approach
[19]. V-MR groups the Map and Reduce instances that have
the same control flow trace into a control flow group such that
all instances in a control flow group have the same control flow
trace.
Grouping instances that have the same control flow helps
to locate the deviated control flow group, which the verifier
marks the workers in the group as suspicious. All Map and
Reduce function call instances in a control flow group have
the same control flow trace. V-MR selects the instances to be
re-executed in each control flow group. If V-MR identifies any
control flow group that did not take eligible execution paths,
that is, one of the all execution paths found in the static CFG,
V-MR rejects the computation results. In this step, V-MR can
optionally select an aribitrary instance from the control flow
group and re-execute it before it stops the entire verification.
Control flow based filtering helps to reduce the input data set
used for the verification. However, we need a better approach
for more sophisticated attack that does not change the control
flow of the original program to avoid the detection while
producing tampered computation results.
2) Program Slicing for Partial Re-execution: MapReduce
applications have relatively simple control flows due to the
defined programming model of the map and reduce function.
The control flow-based filtering of the Map and the Reduce
instances using their control flow trace and static CFG enables
the detection of diverted control flow paths. However, control
flow-based filtering may not be sufficient for detecting a more
sophisticated attack that does not change the control flow.
For the correctness and completeness of integrity verifica-
tion, we also consider data dependency of the program. To
minimize the re-execution overhead, we try to minimize the
program instructions to re-execute as well as the input data set.
V-MR identifies the instructions in a control flow group that do
not change the output of the program across all instances and
eliminates those instructions when it generates the re-execution
code using the program transformation. However, V-MR needs
to re-execute any instructions that produce different outputs
depending on different inputs. To identify those instructions
that need to be included in the re-execution code, we adopt
the taint-based dependency analysis [26]. Similar to POIROT’s
approach, V-MR selects an arbitrary instance from a control
flow group and re-executes the instance with an input record
computed on during original execution. V-MR performs taint-
based dependency analysis at the level of bytecode.
An instance of Map or Reduce function emits the output
only by calling context.write() method (in Hadoop V2)
so we consider the calls to context.write() and an input
record < key, value > pair (i.e., parameters of the function)
that leads to the method call. V-MR uses taint-analysis for
tracking the data dependency but from one arbitrary selected
instances to reduce the tracing overhead. During the re-
execution of the selected instance, V-MR marks these input
parameters (variables) as ”tainted” upon the start of the map
or reduce function. During the execution of the instance, V-MR
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marks the instructions that read the tainted variables and their
outputs tainted as well (Figure 8). These tainted instructions
must be included in the re-execution code as they produce
different outputs for different inputs while taking the same
control flow path.
The instructions that depend on the tainted variables cannot
be eliminated and must be included in the re-execuion code.
If there are identical computations, in which instructions that
do not depend on the tainted variables and control flow
instructions, the instructions can be eliminated when the re-
execution code is generated.
Taint-based dependency tracking produces the following
taint set for the execution of each instruction of the code in
Figure 8.
Taint set:
1 {value}
2 {itr, value}
3 {itr, value}
4 {word, itr, value}
5 {word, itr, value}
Fig. 8. Data Dependency Tracking with Taint analysis (WordCount)
For example, the following instances produce the same
control flow trace and fall into the same control flow group.
While the two different executions follow the same control
flow path, their inputs and outputs are different.
Original WordCount Code (Figure 3):
Input <1, "test">
CFT: 2, 3, 2, 4
Output: <"test", 1>
Attacker’s WordCount Code (Figure 10):
Input <1, "attack">
CFT: 2, 3, 2, 4
Output: <" ", 1>
In this case, control flow analysis solely cannot detect the
attack as the two executions follow the same control flow
path (2, 3, 2, 4) so the re-execution is needed. We use the
taint-based data dependency analysis to determines which
instructions need to be included in the re-execution code. In
this control flow group, let’s suppose that the first instance with
the input < 1, ”test” > is selected for taint analysis, then the
instructions 3, 4, 5, 6 must be included (no elimination of
the instruction). When V-MR re-executes the second instance
(attacker’s code) with the selected instructions 3, 4, 5, 6 on the
input record < 1, ”attack” >, the output is < ”attack”, 1 >,
which is inconsistent with the actual output < ””, 1 > from the
original execution. V-MR detects the inconsistencies between
the outputs and rejects the computation result. V-MR identifies
the malicious worker that emitted the wrong output.
3) Program Transformation for Generating Re-execution
Code: V-MR transforms the original program into a new
program that will be used for the re-execution of selected Map
and Reduce instances using the ASM bytecode manipulation
library. The ASM reads the original bytecodes (the application
class files) and manipulates the bytecodes to generate exe-
cutable class files that will be used for partial re-execution.
In this work, the ASM removes the bytecode instructions
identified by our optimization in the previous step (IV-C2)
from the original program.
A program transformation should preserve the semantic
properties of the original program which should not break the
semantics of the target program or cause any difference in
outputs. The program syntax of the two programs is different
but semantically equivalent, which yields the same output
from the computation (execution of the program) with the
same input. A program transformation is a partial function,
mapping a program P to another program P ′. We use the
ASM bytecode engineering library to transform the original
MapReduce program P into a new MapReduce program
P ′ which the program slicing has been applied to P . V-
MR re-executes the selected instances with the transformed
MapReduce program during the verification phase.
4) Re-execution: Once V-MR completes the selection of
Map and Reduce instances to re-execute and the generation
of re-execution code during the preprocessing phase, V-MR
partially re-executes the instances on the re-execution code
and selected input records for the verification of the compu-
tation integrity. The verifier runs the re-execution code on the
MapReduce runtime in the private cluster/private cloud.
V-MR partially re-executes the selected instances in each
control flow group on the re-execution code and chosen input
records. It then compares the outputs with those of the original
execution to check whether the computations in each control
flow group are correct. If the outputs of the re-execution
are the same as the outputs of the original execution, V-MR
accepts the original computation as correct. If the outputs from
two executions are different, V-MR rejects the computation as
incorrect and identifies the workers that produced the wrong
computation results. V-MR checks the computation integrity of
the map and the reduce function separately. If and only if the
computation integrity of all mappers is verified and accepted,
V-MR proceeds to the next step to verify the computation
integrity of the reducers.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we describe our prototype implmentation
of a prototype of V-MR for MapReduce applications. V-MR’s
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components are implemented in Python and the ASM bytecode
library.
A. Bytecode Instrumentation
There are two types of bytecode instrumentation techniques
- the static instrumentation and the dynamic instrumentation.
The static instrumentation inserts all instrumentation code
before the program starts execution, while dynamic instrumen-
tation injects the instrumentation code into the running process
at runtime. In this work, we use the dynamic instrumentation
to check the behavior of the program at runtime.
We use the ASM bytecode engineering library to instrument
the bytecodes of the MapReduce applications. Our selection
of the ASM bytecode engineering library aside from other
instrumentation libraries is for better performance and a small
memory footprint. V-MR dynamically instruments the MapRe-
duce application classes loaded into the JVM through a Java
agent. Our Java agent is built on the ASM bytecode manipu-
lation framework with the event-based ASM API, which con-
tains a pre-main method that implements a class transformer
(ClassFileTransformer) that is composed of a class
reader (ClassReader) and a class writer (ClassWriter).
The Java agent records the control flow traces of the target
program during normal execution without any modification of
the program. The control flow trace logs from workers are
aggregated and sent to the verifier (Figure 9).
1 package asm;
2 import java.lang.instrument.Instrumentation;
3 public class Agent {
4 public static void premain(
5 String args, Instrumentation inst) {
6 inst.addTransformer(new
CustomClassTranformer());
7 }
8 }
9 ...
10
11 public class CustomClassTransformer
12 implements ClassFileTransformer {
13 public byte[] transform(...) {
14 ClassWriter cw = new ClassWriter(true);
15 ProfilerVisitor cv = new
ProfilerVisitor(cw);
16 ClassReader cr = new
ClassReader(classfileBuffer);
17 cr.accept(cv, false);
18 return cw.toByteArray();
19 }
20 }
Fig. 9. ASM Java Agent code snippet
B. Re-execution Code Generation
V-MR generates efficient re-execution code using program
slicing [27] which extracts an executable subset (a slice)
of the original program. We use the ASM library with the
template which we created from the taint-based dependency
tracking. For each control flow group, the new execution code
is generated using ASM instrumentation with the common
bytecode instructions extracted from the original code, which
are also Java bytecodes (executable class file). V-MR runs the
new code with the same input data for selected worker node
to be checked and compare the results of two executions for
the computation integrity.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we show the effectiveness and the perfor-
mance of our approach. First, we used three attack scenarios
to show the effectiveness of V-MR. Second, we show the
experiments results that we performed and the metrics that we
used to evaluate the performance of V-MR. Table I describes
the MapReduce applications we used for the experiment. We
show the tracing overhead of V-MR and running time of partial
re-execution compared with naive full re-execution.
A. Experimental Setup
In this section, we describe the experimental setup for
evaluating a prototype of V-MR. We built an experiment
Hadoop cluster with two physical machines of the 8-core
CPU of 3.40 GHz. The experiment cluster consists of 6
virtual machines (VM), which are provisioned from these two
physical machines using VirtualBox and have Ubuntu 14.04
LTS and Hadoop 2.6.2 installed. Among these VM nodes,
one VM is configured as a master node and the other VMs
configured as worker nodes. We also built a separate private
verifier cluster with one physical machine of the 8-core CPU
of 3.40 GHz, which consists of 4 virtual machines that have
Ubuntu 14.04 LTS and Hadoop 2.6.2 are installed.
Hadoop consists of two layers: MapReduce for data pro-
cessing, and Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) for
data storage. A Hadoop cluster includes a single master node
and multiple slave nodes. The master node acts as bot the
ResourceManager for scheduling map or reduce jobs and the
NameNode for hosting HDFS indexes. Each slave node acts
as both the NodeManager for conducting the map or reduce
operations and the DataNode for storing data blocks in HDFS.
B. Attack simulation
In this section, we use several attack cases to show that
our verifier is effective to detect the tampered MapReduce
computations.
To simulate our attack scenarios, a malicious code may be
injected using the Hadoop’s “Zip Slip” vulnerability (CVE-
2018-8009) that has been recently found. The vulnerability is
exploited using a specially crafted archive that holds directory
traversal filenames (e.g. ../../evil.sh). The Zip Slip
vulnerability [28] can affect numerous archive formats, includ-
ing tar, jar, war, cpio, apk, rar and 7z. Zip Slip is a directory
traversal vulnerability that can be exploited by extracting files
from an archive. An attacker can gain access to parts of the
file system outside of the target folder in which they should
reside. The attacker can then overwrite executable files, thus
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TABLE I
DESCRIPTION OF MAPREDUCE APPLICATIONS
Program Description
Word Count A MapReduce program that reads
text files and counts how often
words occur.
Inverted Index A MapReduce program that is an
index data structure storing a map-
ping from content, such as words
or numbers, to its locations in a
database file, or in a document or
a set of documents.
Web log analysis (Hit Count) A MapReduce program that ana-
lyze Web application logs such as
the hit count and the frequency of
URLs.
Web log analysis (Frequency) A MapReduce program that makes
frequency distribution of the num-
ber of hits received by each URL
sorted in ascending order, which
simply sorts the list based on the
number of hits that is calculated
by the above Web log analysis (Hit
Count) program.
achieving remote command execution on the victim’s machine.
The attacker also can overwrite configuration files or other
sensitive resources. The vulnerability can be exploited on both
client machines and servers.
Distributed Cache is a facility provided by the Hadoop
MapReduce framework. It caches files when needed by the
applications. It can cache read-only text files, archives, jar
files, etc. For example, a user-defined MapReduce program
will be available on each data node where MapReduce tasks
are running. Thus, we can access files from all the data nodes
on the MapReduce job.
To simulate the attack, Hadoop’s Distributed Cache facility
is used. The attacker’s code is copied to File System and then
set up the application’s JobConf to add the files to Distributed
Cache and modify the Mapper or Reducer’s code to use the
cached files (i.e., attacker’s code).
C. Effectiveness
Our primary focus is on detecting integrity attacks to
MapReduce computation where a compromised worker pro-
duces the incorrect outputs. We show the effectiveness of our
approach with following attack scenarios.
1) Attack Scenario 1: The attacker’s MapReduce code ran
on one of the worker nodes and produced the incorrect output.
Figure 10 shows the attacker’s WordCount code snippet. The
attacker’s code can exploit the integrity attack to WordCount
application, which calls method foo() in the map function.
This code disrupts the computation output by modifying the
word to be emitted to an empty string right before emitting the
output, which results in the output with words of the empty
string. Figure 11 shows the corresponding bytecodes of map
function which invoke the attacker’s method call, foo().
The attack is detected by control flow analysis and control
flow filtering. The control flow trace shows the diverted control
flow which is different from the execution paths in CFG of
1
2 public class WordCount {
3
4 public static class TokenizerMapper
5 extends Mapper<Object, Text, Text,
IntWritable>{
6
7 private final static IntWritable one = new
IntWritable(1);
8 private Text word = new Text();
9
10 public void map(Object key, Text value,
Context context
11 ) throws IOException,
InterruptedException {
12 StringTokenizer itr = new
StringTokenizer(value.toString());
13
14 while (itr.hasMoreTokens()) {
15 word.set(itr.nextToken());
16 if (word.getLength() > 0)
17 foo(word);
18 context.write(word, one);
19 }
20 }
21
22 public static void foo(Text value) {
23 value.clear();
24 }
25 }
Fig. 10. Code snippet of simulated Attack #1 (WordCount)
the original program. V-MR detects the diverted control flow
and rejects the computation results.
V-MR was able to detect the attack by control flow analysis
and re-execution was not needed. V-MR’s verification result
is REJECT.
2) Attack Scenario 2: The attacker’s code produced incor-
rect outputs while the control flow trace shows that it followed
a valid control flow path.
In the WordCount program, context.write(word,
one) method call emits the output, a < key, value > pair,
where the parameter ’one’ represents one occurrence of a
word. The attacker’s code uses ’2’ instead of ’1’, with the
modified statement as follows.
private final static IntWritable one =
new IntWritable(2);
This attack does not change the control flow of the program
but the modification of the constant variable alters the output.
For example, the attacker’s code produces < ”test”, 2 >,
which is different from the correct output < ”test”, 1 >. The
Figure 15 and Figure 16 show the difference in the bytecodes
between the original code and the attack code. Figure 17 shows
the tampered output of Mapper by the attack.
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1 13: aload 4
2 15: invokevirtual #8
3 18: ifeq 64
4 21: aload_0
5 22: getfield #4
6 25: aload 4
7 27: invokevirtual #9
8 30: invokevirtual #10
9 33: aload_0
10 34: getfield #4
11 37: invokevirtual #11
12 40: ifle 50
13 43: aload_0
14 44: getfield #4
15 47: invokestatic #12
16 50: aload_3
17 51: aload_0
18 52: getfield #4
19 55: getstatic #13
20 58: invokevirtual #14
21 61: goto 13
22 64: return
23
24 public static void
foo(org.apache.hadoop.io.Text);
25 Code:
26 0: aload_0
27 1: invokevirtual #15
28 4: return
Fig. 11. Bytecode snippet of WordCount Attack #1
...
year 11
year. 2
years 14
years, 2
yelling 1
yellow, 1
yells. 1
yen 1
yet 29
yet." 1
....
Fig. 12. WordCount final output (normal execution)
...
1
1
1
1
....
Fig. 13. Disrupted Mapper’s output
1 ...
2 years, 1
3 yellow, 1
4 ...
5 zenana, 1
6 zenith 1
7 | 31
8 57336
Fig. 14. Incorrect final result of WordCount job caused by one compromised
Mapper
The control flow trace shows the valid execution path but
the re-execution can identify that the output is wrong, which
is different from the original output.
Control flow analysis was not sufficient for detecting the
attack and re-execution was needed. V-MR was able to detect
the attack via partial re-execution and the verification result is
REJECT.
1 static {};
2 Code:
3 0: new #14
4 3: dup
5 4: iconst_1
6 5: invokespecial #15
7 8: putstatic #11
8 11: return
Fig. 15. Attack #2: original bytecode snippet
1 static {};
2 Code:
3 0: new #14
4 3: dup
5 4: iconst_2
6 5: invokespecial #15
7 8: putstatic #11
8 11: return
Fig. 16. Attack #2: attack bytecode snippet
...
years, 2
yellow, 2
...
zenana, 2
zenith 2
Fig. 17. Incorrect intermediate result of WordCount job by Attack #2
The attacker compromises the program without being de-
tected by early stage of the verification. However, the re-
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TABLE II
DETECTION OF EXPLOITS
Exploits Description FP FN
Cheating worker skipping computation No Yes
Malicious worker malicious modification on map function No No
Malicious worker malicious modificaiton on reduce function No No
Collusion collusion attack No No
execution will detect the output is different from the original
output.
3) Attack Scenario 3: Collaborating attackers: The col-
laborating attackers’ code executes on two different workers,
which modifies their computation results as the same output
with given the same input, using Attack #2.
This collaborating attack is detected by partial re-execution
as the outputs of two computations by collaborating workers
are different from the outputs of the re-executions by V-MR.
While other replication-based verification approaches that use
peer comparisons for checking the integrity cannot detect
a collaborating attack unless the majority of the workers
are honest. However, our approach can detect collaborative
attacks.
Control flow analysis cannot detect the attack, while re-
execution was able to detect the attack. V-MR’s verification
result is REJECT.
D. Experimental Results
We measured the efficiency of the prototype of V-MR and
the overhead of tracing (with instrumentation) compared to
a baseline of simple re-execution of the replication-based
verification approach for the evaluation of the verifier. To
measure the overhead introduced by trace logging, we per-
formed experiments with several Hadoop applications that are
obtained from [29]. We use five MapReduce applications:
WordCount, InvertedIndex, and three applications for Web
application log analysis using the NASA Web Log dataset,
for the experiments. We measured the execution time of the
original code and re-execution code.
1) Time and Space Overhead for Tracing: We performed
experiments to study the time and space overhead for recording
control flow traces of running Hadoop programs on worker
nodes during original execution.
Table III shows the time overhead of V-MR with the
instrumentation. While we can optimize further to reduce the
tracing overhead in the future, the current prototype of V-
MR incurs moderate tracing overhead. The space overhead
for tracing is shown in Table IV. Since the verification is
performed by a client’s on-demand request and the trace logs
can be deleted upon the verification is complete, the space
overhead for tracing is not a concern in this work.
2) Execution time: We measured the execution time for
each Map and Reduce task of full re-execution and partial re-
execution to get the idea of speedup by our partial re-execution
approach compared to a naive replication-based approach.
TABLE III
TIME OVERHEAD FOR TRACING (MAPPER)
Program # input records w/o tracing w/ tracing
WordCount 6982 3171 3725 (17.4%)
InvertedIndex 6982 4006 4170 (24%)
WebLog (HitCount) 1891715 33188 64515 (39.6%)
WebLog (Frequency) 18617 3683 3970 (7.2%)
TABLE IV
SPACE OVERHEAD OF TRACING (MAPPER)
Program # input records Size (KB)
WordCount 6982 121
InvertedIndex 6982 182
WebLog (HitCount) 1891715 4867
WebLog (Frequency) 18617 37
Table V shows the experiment results in terms of the
speedup by V-MR. Most applications we used for the experi-
mentation show that the execution time is much faster than the
naive full execution even with the small size of input data set,
while the Weblog application that finds the frequency of Hit
count of URLs did not speed up. We intentionally selected
this uncommon type of MapReduce application to simulate
the case that our partial re-execution approach is not efficient
in reducing the re-execution cost. The application does not
have any control flow transfer in the map and reduce function
as it simply sorts the results produced by WebLog Hitcount
application. There is no option to optimize for the selection
of data and the instruction elimination for re-execution. In
this case, while it is very rare, it can be verified by re-
executing on randomly chosen instances, which is similar
to other replication-based approaches. The effect of speedup
of re-execution by input data slicing and program slicing is
dependent on the ratio of the slice cut on data and program
code. The Hadoop applications we used for the experiment in
this work have relatively small code size (a small number of
instructions) in the map and reduce function with small input
data set so did not lead to dramatic speedup. However, more
complex applications that have much more instructions and
larger input data set can benefit more from the effect of the
speedup, which remains to be future work.
VII. CONCLUSION
This work demonstrated our approach to practical verifi-
cation of the integrity of outsourced computation via partial
re-execution. We investigated the computation result integrity
of MapReduce applications as the case study. Our verifica-
tion framework, V-MR can detect the tampered MapReduce
computations using partial re-execution without modifying
the MapReduce framework or application source code. V-
MR reduces the re-execution cost by input data slicing and
program slicing techniques based on the control flow and data
dependency analysis. V-MR is more effective and considerably
more efficient than other naive replication-based verification
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TABLE V
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON (RE-EXECUTION TIME)
Program Input Size (# records) Running Time (ms) SpeedupBaseline V-MR Baseline V-MR
WordCount 6982 5865 3171 2663 1.19
InvertedIndex 6982 5839 4006 2804 1.43
WebLog (HitCount) 1891715 1237097 33188 17589 1.89
WebLog (Frequency) 18617 18617 3683 3683 1
approaches as it can detect attacks against computation in-
tegrity with no false positives and few false negatives (shown
in Table II) while it can also speed up the verification via
efficient partial re-execution.
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